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ABSTRACT. Major oil spills normally occur from oil pipelines and oil tankers that are under operational control of companies,
namely, oil companies and tanker owners. There are two generic responses for changing the behavior of companies with regard
to oil spill prevention: mandatory government regulation or voluntary initiatives often pursued under the banner of Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR). Here we investigate to what extent voluntary CSR initiatives can be effective in oil spill prevention.
A global perspective on voluntary mechanisms is taken by looking at the progress of 20 oil and gas firms from around the world
toward oil spill prevention, using the companies’ 2010 sustainability reports for self-reported oil spill information. The analysis
includes ten oil companies from OECD countries (including Exxon and Shell, among others) and 10 oil companies from non-
OECD countries (including Brazil’s Petrobras and Indian Oil, among others). The study finds that oil spill prevention has
generally improved over recent decades. Government regulation played a significant part in these improvements whereas it is
less clear to what extent CSR played a significant part in these improvements. Some of CSR’s key limitations are highlighted.
It is not suggested that CSR should be abandoned; however, new hybrid forms of regulation that combine voluntary and mandatory
elements are advocated.
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INTRODUCTION
Major oil spills normally occur from oil installations and oil
tankers that are under operational control of companies, that
is, oil companies and tanker owners. There are two generic
responses for changing the behavior of companies with regard
to oil spill prevention: mandatory government regulation or
voluntary initiatives often pursued under the banner of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Here we investigate
the potential of voluntary CSR initiatives for preventing oil
spills, ask to what extent CSR can be effective and to what
extent CSR should supplant or complement mandatory
regulation. 
The oil and gas sector has been among the leading industries
in championing CSR. One explanation is that oil and gas
operations pose serious threats to the environment at each stage
of the industrial process: construction, exploration,
production, transportation, and refining (Clark 1982, Estrada
et al. 1997), while multinational oil companies are more
vulnerable to civil society pressures than companies in some
other sectors of the economy because the negative effects of
oil operations are highly visible and because the companies’
international brand reputations are vulnerable (Austin and
Sauer 2002, Frynas 2009). Another important explanation is
that oil companies are willing to accept higher levels of socio-
political risks as they are forced to operate in more challenging
environments for geological reasons, with oil and gas deposits
often being located near ecologically vulnerable areas and in
countries with poor governance (Pegg 2006, Chen 2007). 
The growth of CSR is demonstrated, among others, by the
remarkable growth of corporate codes of conduct and social
and environmental reporting. A total of 95% of the world’s
250 largest companies formally report on their CSR activities,
with oil companies being at the forefront of this reporting
movement (KPMG International 2011). CSR has become
more sophisticated and complex from the mid 1990s. Oil
companies have joined various international voluntary
initiatives aimed at addressing different aspects of
sustainability, including the Global Reporting Initiative
(1997), UN Global Compact (1999), Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights (2000), Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI – 2003) and Combat Climate
Change 3C Initiative (2007) (Frynas 2010).  
At the same time, CSR has been criticized from different
perspectives. On the one hand, some business writers have
traditionally asserted that CSR is misguided in principle.
According to this view, by pursuing social and environmental
objectives, firms may ultimately hurt shareholders by
generating lower profits, while firms are said to lack the
expertise to engage in solving social and environmental
problems (Friedman 1962, Henderson 2001, Ottaway 2001).
On the other hand, various studies have pointed to the
limitations and relatively poor results of existing CSR
initiatives in terms of delivering social and environmental
outcomes, including studies that specifically investigated CSR
in the oil and gas sector (Pegg 2006, Soares de Oliveira 2007,
Frynas 2009, Gillies 2010). 
It is therefore pertinent to ask whether the emerging system
of voluntary self-regulation has led to genuine improvements
in the environmental performance of oil companies. We
investigate improvements in oil spill prevention by comparing
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the possible impact of voluntary CSR initiatives vis-à-vis
mandatory government regulation (for an overview and
timeline, see Table 1).
Table 1. Timeline of key oil spill-relevant CSR initiatives and
international mandatory regulation.
 
Voluntary CSR initiative
 
Mandatory government regulation
 
1969 Tanker Owners’ Voluntary
Agreement concerning Liability for
Oil Pollution (TOVALOP)
 
1969 International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (CLC)
 
1970 Oil Companies International
Marine Forum (OCIMF)
 
1971 International Convention on
the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (FUND)
 
1974 Offshore Pollution Liability
Agreement (OPOL)
 
1973 International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution From
Ships (MARPOL, in force from
1983)
 
1993 Ship Inspection Report
Programme (SIRE)
 
1974 International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
 
1997 Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI)
 
1992 MARPOL Amendment on
Prevention of Pollution by Harmful
Substances Carried by Sea in
Packaged Form
 
2005 Oil and gas industry guidance
on voluntary sustainability
reporting
 
2003 MARPOL Amendment on
Prevention of Pollution by Sewage
from Ships
 
The author does not have a strong ideological preference for
either voluntary CSR initiatives or mandatory government
regulation, and the starting point of this study is simply
pragmatic by asking to what extent voluntary CSR initiatives
of companies can replace or complement government
regulation as the determinant of responsible environmental
practices. Based on the available evidence, it is concluded that
oil spill prevention has generally improved over recent
decades. Government regulation played a significant part in
these improvements whereas it is less clear to what extent CSR
played a significant part in these improvements. Some of
CSR’s key limitations are highlighted.
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
CSR has been evolving over the last three decades alongside
related concepts such as accountability and sustainability.
However, there is no agreement on what exactly CSR stands
for or where the boundaries of CSR lie (Lockett et al. 2006,
Blowfield and Murray 2008).  
The responsibilities of companies are often defined differently
depending on the social, especially national, context
(Waldman et al. 2006, Freeman and Hasnaoui 2011) and the
industry context (Frynas 2009, Runhaar and Lafferty 2009).
Furthermore, CSR is a dynamic concept and its meaning can
change over time (Carroll 1999, Matten and Moon 2008). One
recent study concluded that “the definition of CSR is not only
inconsistent across national boundaries, but the definitions are
not consistent within countries” (Freeman and Hasnaoui
2011:439). Therefore, it is most appropriate to define CSR as
an umbrella term for a variety of different theories and
practices all of which recognize that companies have a
responsibility for their impact on society and the natural
environment, that companies have a responsibility for the
behavior of others with whom they do business, and that CSR
activities are normally conducted on a voluntary basis beyond
legal compliance (Blowfield and Frynas 2005 cf. Matten and
Crane 2005). The voluntary aspect forms the key
distinguishing characteristic between CSR and mandatory
regulation in that CSR establishes certain standards and rules
of behavior that are followed by companies voluntarily, even
though there is no mandatory requirement to do so.  
CSR encompasses many different areas, ranging from health
and safety to human rights, but research consistently suggests
that CSR has greatest potential with regard to environmental
management (SustainAbility 2001, 2002, Molina-Azorín et
al. 2009). The business literature suggests that voluntary
environmental initiatives can help to lead to substantial
improvements in environmental practices by business such as
reduction in the use of materials and emissions, increased
recycling or adoption of new environmentally-friendly
products, while at the same time the most environmentally-
friendly companies are rewarded with higher profitability (for
example, King and Lenox 2002, Molina-Azorín et al. 2009). 
On the one hand, business research suggests that companies
can benefit from environmental management in terms of a
better reputation (differentiation vis-à-vis competitors), lower
costs (lower energy and materials use) and innovation (new
green products, practices, and patents) (Miles and Covin 2000,
Molina-Azorín et al. 2009). On the other hand, business
research suggests that management tools, methods, and
practices (e.g., quality management or performance
management) are particularly suited for environmental
improvements because they share similar purposes and
approaches to implementation (Frynas 2009:79-80; Molina-
Azorín et al. 2009). Therefore, one would expect many
companies to voluntarily engage in environmental
management and, in turn, to make significant environmental
improvements.  
The benefits of CSR and environmental management have
been explored with specific reference to the oil and gas sector.
One study compared seven Canadian oil companies and found
that the two companies most proactive on environmental
improvements greatly benefited from higher profits and
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Table 2. Core environmental indicators reported by selected oil companies for 2010.
 
Company Country Core Environmental Indicators
Hydrocarbon Spills Greenhouse
Emissions
Flared Gas Energy Use Waste
Oil companies from OECD countries
BP UK REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED
Shell UK/Netherl. REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED
Chevron USA REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED LIMITED
Exxon USA REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED LIMITED REPORTED
Statoil Norway REPORTED REPORTED LIMITED REPORTED LIMITED
Total France REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED
ENI Italy REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED
Repsol Spain REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED
OMV Austria REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED
MOL Hungary REPORTED REPORTED - - REPORTED
Oil companies from non-OECD countries
CNOOC† China LIMITED - - - -
Sinopec China - LIMITED LIMITED - -
Lukoil Russia - REPORTED - - REPORTED
Gazprom Russia - REPORTED - LIMITED REPORTED
ONGC India - REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED -
Indian Oil India - LIMITED - LIMITED -
Petrobras† Brazil REPORTED REPORTED - REPORTED LIMITED
Petronas Malaysia LIMITED REPORTED LIMITED LIMITED -
Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia - - - LIMITED -
ADNOC UAE‡ LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED
Source: Sustainability or CSR reports for the respective companies, covering data for 2010
† 2009 data; ‡ United Arab Emirates
innovations such as technology patents in the areas of process
improvement, sulfur dioxide recovery, waste reduction and
disposal, soil restoration, and less polluting fuels (Sharma and
Vredenburg 1998). Another study on large multinational oil
companies found that there is often a convergence of
environmental and business interests, for instance, in terms of
reducing carbon dioxide emissions or implementing a zero-
spill policy for the company (Frynas 2009). In sum, existing
business research implies that both companies and the natural
environment could greatly benefit from voluntary initiatives
such as oil spill prevention.
POTENTIAL OF CSR FOR ADDRESSING OIL
SPILLS
As one indication of CSR, oil companies now provide
extensive reporting on their environmental performance, as
part of their annual sustainability or CSR reports. As part of
this reporting, most large oil companies publish some
environmental indicators on an annual basis. Recommended
environmental indicators for voluntary self-reporting by oil
companies are contained in the universal Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI) G3 guidelines published in 2006 (Global
Reporting Initiative 2006) and the sector-specific Oil and Gas
Industry Guidance on voluntary sustainability reporting
(hereafter: Oil Guidance) published in 2010 (IPIECA 2010). 
In order to investigate the quality of voluntary environmental
self-reporting, this study has analyzed the 2010 sustainability
reports by 20 leading oil and gas companies. Sample selection
was based on ensuring a wide variance in terms of headquarter
location of the organizations in order to reduce a developed
country bias. The analysis includes 10 oil companies from
OECD countries (including Exxon, Shell, among others) and
10 oil companies from non-OECD countries (including
Brazil’s Petrobras, and Saudi Aramco, among others). 
Table 2 lists 20 oil companies and five key areas for
environmental reporting in the oil sector. For oil spills in Table
2, “Reported” means that the company reports both the
absolute number of oil spills (normally above 1 barrel) and
the volume of oil spills (in barrels, metric tons or another unit
of measurement), in line with the recommendations by the
2010 Oil Guidance; “Limited” means that the company only
provides part of the information. Table 2 suggests that
companies from OECD countries normally report on oil spills
(all companies in our samples provide data), but companies
from non-OECD countries do not normally provide that data
(Brazil’s Petrobras is the only exception in our sample). 
The lack of an environmental report would not necessarily
imply that a company is irresponsible, but regular publication
of consistent oil spill and other environmental data may help
to compare the performance of companies and to encourage
them toward improvements (Frynas 2009:87). The incidence
of oil spills is not entirely comparable year-by-year because
it can be affected by levels of production and by natural
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Table 3. Number of self-reported oil spills by selected companies, 2001-2010.
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BP† 810 761 635 578 541 417 213 170 122 142
Chevron† 1428 1502 1145 986 846 803 826 760 798 639
Exxon† n/a n/a 466 475 370 295 253 211 242 210
Shell‡ n/a 912 780 812 671 588 589 390 370 305
† spills above 1 barrel
‡ spills above 100 kilograms
disasters (e.g., hurricanes in 2005), and the volume of oil spills
in a given year can be affected by a particularly large oil spill.
Nonetheless, a comparison of oil spill data for 2001-2010
provided by companies in their CSR reports suggests that some
companies are progressively reducing the number of even the
smallest oil spills (see Table 3). Unfortunately, the self-
reported data does not allow a comparison of spill volumes
between the companies. Furthermore, available statistical data
for 2002-2010 by the International Association of Oil and Gas
Producers (which is also based on self-reported data by
member companies) does not corroborate a general downward
trend reported by some individual company reports (see Table
4). 
The most impressive evidence on oil spill prevention is
provided by a historical comparison of major oil spills from
oil tankers (Burgherr 2007). Since the 1970s, the number of
major oil spills (above 700 metric tons) caused by oil tankers
and other vessels has dramatically decreased from an average
25.3 spills per year in the period 1970-1979 to 3.3 spills per
year in the period 2000-2009. During the 1970s, almost 30
major oil spills per year was not unusual. During the period
2000-2009, the highest annual number of major oil spills was
five in 2004 and 2006. The volume of oil spills has also
dramatically decreased over the last three decades, except for
the year 2002 when the Greek-owned oil tanker “Prestige”
sank off the coast of Spain (see Figures 1 and 2). 
A reduction in oil spills raises the question as to what extent
CSR contributed to better oil spill prevention. Voluntary
regulation already started in 1969 when oil companies
established an industry-wide voluntary agreement called the
Tanker Owners’ Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability
for Oil Pollution (referred to as TOVALOP) and in 1974, the
Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (referred to as OPOL)
was set up to meet claims for marine pollution damage and
environmental cleanup costs. Under the terms of these
agreements, oil companies voluntarily accepted strict liability
for pollution damage and the cost of remedial measures
(International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds 2004).
Another early example of voluntary regulation for oil spill
prevention was the Oil Companies International Marine
Forum (OCIMF), a voluntary association of oil companies
founded in 1970 dedicated to the mission of being “the
foremost authority on the safe and environmentally
responsible operation of oil tankers, terminals and offshore
support vessels, promoting continuous improvement in
standards of design and operation” (Oil Companies
International Marine Forum 2011). As of 2011, OCIMF had
86 members, including large multinational companies like
Shell and Petrobras (Oil Companies International Marine
Forum 2011).
Fig. 1. Number of marine oil spills worldwide over 700
metric tonnes from 1970-2010.
A reduction in marine oil spills should be at least partly
attributed to improved condition of oil tankers and other ships,
which in turn may be at least partly attributed to voluntary
initiatives. OCIMF’s key voluntary initiative was the
launching of the Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE)
in 1993, giving rise to a sophisticated vetting system for oil
tankers with the ultimate purpose of improving the condition
of ships. SIRE created a vast database of up-to-date
information about oil tankers and other vessels. OCIMF
member companies carry out ship inspections according to a
standard protocol, and the inspection results are reported to
the SIRE database. As of October 2011, the database held over
22,500 reports on over 8000 vessels, with an inspection
conducted in the previous 12 months. The inspection results
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Table 4. Quantity of oil spilled onshore and offshore per unit of hydrocarbon production (tonnes per million tonnes), 2002-2010.
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Onshore 13.1 7.5 6.0 7.9 17.3 10.9 18.5 47.0 7.1
Offshore 0.3 1.8 0.5 0.6 0.4 4.0 3.0 1.6 0.7
Total 5.9 4.5 3.7 4.3 7.6 6.9 8.7 18.8 4.5
Source: Annual reports (2003-2011) of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. Environmental Performance in the E&P Industry. London,
United Kingdom.
can be viewed by OCIMF member companies, port authorities,
specific government bodies and others, creating strong
incentives for vessel owners to eliminate all vessel defects. 
While it is difficult to differentiate between the impact of
voluntary and mandatory regulation, recent statistical analysis
suggests that SIRE inspections decrease the risk of ship
accidents, and the effect of inspections increases with ship age
(Bijwaard and Knapp 2009). Another recent study on shipping
and marine safety concluded that “tankers, dry bulk carriers,
and general cargo vessels have improved more, in comparison
with passenger and container vessels, perhaps due to the
impact of industry vetting inspections for tankers and dry bulk
carrier” (Knapp and van de Velden 2011:599). Given that
voluntary ship inspections help to reduce the number of ship
accidents and oil spills, recent statistical analysis suggests that
such inspections lead to substantial long-term cost savings for
oil companies (Knapp et al. 2011), which is in line with our
expectations that voluntary initiatives can benefit both the
natural environment and oil companies.  
The aftermath of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill provides another
example of the potential of voluntary regulation for oil spill
prevention. The reduction in oil spills in U.S. waters in the
period 1990-1995 has been attributed to a number of voluntary
initiatives, since this reduction had already occurred before
the 1990 Oil Pollution Act was fully operational in 1996. These
voluntary initiatives included an increase in company
awareness of liability, improved audit and inspection of ships,
increased efforts by classification societies to ensure vessels
meet requirements, voluntary replacement of old vessels with
double-hull vessels, improved staff training, and vessel
routing changes, although it is not possible to directly link one
specific factor to oil spill reduction (U.S....1996, Kim 2002). 
While mandatory regulation normally focuses on compliance
with basic minimum requirements, one key advantage of CSR
is that it can help develop new and better environmental
practices, for instance, the use of better materials (e.g.,
replacing steel tubes with chrome tubes) or better oil spill
cleanup techniques (e.g., burning oil in broken ice) (Frynas
2009, Sørstrøm et al. 2010). Indeed, the business literature
suggests that CSR can lead to a multitude of environmental
innovations (Lanjouw and Mody 1996, Sharma and
Vredenburg 1998) because it can force companies to question
existing assumptions and to seek new strategies to grow and
develop their business (Kanter 1999, Porter and Kramer 2006).
This points to the general strength of voluntary initiatives in
terms of using private sector creativity to decide on the process
of how to achieve desired environmental improvements. 
Better environmental practices and innovations have become
of greater importance for oil spill prevention, since oil
operations are expanding into technologically more
challenging environments, including the Arctic and ultra
deepwater areas. Furthermore, many developing nations may
not have the capacity to effectively regulate a technically
sophisticated industry (related to their lack of institutional
capacity and the lack of government funding for effectively
enforcing high environmental standards) and voluntary
regulation may occasionally offer a better hope of addressing
environmental issues. Indeed, the lack of adequate mandatory
regulation in developing economies may be the main argument
for encouraging voluntary environmental regulation among
companies. Examples of voluntary environmental measures,
even when there was little government pressure to do so,
include the replacement of old pipelines in Nigeria and the
introduction of the European standards of environmental self-
reporting in Egypt (Frynas 2009).
LIMITATIONS OF CSR VERSUS MANDATORY
REGULATION
The information presented thus far relied heavily on self-
reported oil spill data. However, voluntary environmental
reporting raises questions about the reliability of self-reported
company data. For instance, BP sustainability report 2006
reported 417 oil spills in 2006, while BP sustainability report
2010 reported 300 oil spills in the same year 2006; the 2010
report also failed to include the volume of oil spilled in the
2010 Deepwater Horizon accident in its reported figure for
2010 as the spill volume was still undetermined. China’s
largest oil company Sinopec stated in its 2010 sustainability
report that “there were no accidents that caused major pollution
to the environment” and Russia’s largest oil company Lukoil
made similar claims about oil spills in 2010, claims that are
difficult to believe for a company of Sinopec’s or Lukoil’s
size. Many large oil companies use external assurance
organizations to verify CSR reports, but the self-reported
environmental indicators are normally not questioned. 
Voluntary environmental reporting raises questions about
comparability. Over the last decade, efforts have been made
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Fig. 2. Quantity of marine oil spills (metric tonnes) worldwide from 1970-2010.
to standardize voluntary environmental reporting through the
2005 and 2010 Oil Guidance and subsequently improved
editions of GRI guidelines. However, it is still impossible to
compare the most basic data even among those oil companies
that are most active in CSR initiatives. For instance, BP reports
volume of oil spills in million liters, Shell in thousand metric
tons, Exxon in thousand barrels and Statoil in cubic meters.
Conversion from one unit of measurement to another is
difficult because of the different chemical properties of
different varieties of crude oil.  
Most large companies report the total spill number and
volume, while a number of others such as Shell use different
categories; for example, Shell distinguishes between
operational spills, sabotage spills, and hurricane spills and
does not provide a single composite figure. Some companies
count different types of oil spills differently, for instance, as
part of its reported total figure for oil spills, Chevron counts
oil spills to land above one barrel only, but Chevron counts
all spills to water, including those that are smaller than one
barrel. As a result, the number of Chevron spills would appear
to be a lot higher than the number of spills caused by Shell
and other companies, but it only means that Chevron has been
more conscientious in terms of providing data.  
In sum, despite the use of the same GRI or Oil Guidance
recommendations, it is impossible to compare oil spill
performance between companies. In other words, voluntary
regulation currently fails to provide even the most basic level
of transparency on oil spill performance. 
More seriously, leading business thinkers writing about
environmental management themselves suggest that
mandatory environmental regulation is necessary for
companies to be pushed into action for several key reasons,
including to educate the majority of companies about the
opportunities for better resource use and technological
improvements, to create a demand for environmental
improvements until the market is capable of perceiving and
measuring the benefits of environmental improvements, and
to level the playing field in order to ensure that a company
cannot gain a competitive advantage by avoiding
environmental improvements (Van der Linde 1993, Porter and
Van Der Linde 1995). In other words, the industry cannot be
left to decide the desired environmental outcomes. 
Indeed, previous empirical studies demonstrate that voluntary
initiatives are often motivated by existing and anticipated
pressures of mandatory regulations (Nakamura et al. 2001,
Khanna and Anton 2002, Uchida and Ferraro 2007). With
regard to oil spills specifically, companies are said to be aware
that major oil spills often lead to public calls for greater
regulation and “voluntary” regulation can be a means to avert
mandatory regulation, since companies normally prefer
voluntary self-regulation (Frynas 2009:92-94). For example,
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 led to the creation of the
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Table 5. Selected marine oil spills and development of mandatory regulations relevant to oil tankers, 1967-2005.
 
Year Ship name Location Spill size (tons) Economic cost Resulting regulation
1967 Torrey Canyon Scilly Isles, UK 119,000 n/a 1969 CLC Convention
1971 FUND Convention
1978 Amoco Cadiz Off the coast of France 223,000 US$ 282 million 1981 and 1983 SOLAS Amendments
1982 Paris MoU on Port State Control
1989 Exxon Valdez Prince William Sound, USA 37,000 US$ 9.5 billion 1990 Oil Pollution Act in the US
1992 MARPOL Amendment
1999 Erika Off the coast of France 20,000 US$ 180 million 2001 MARPOL Amendment
2002 Prestige Off the coast of Spain 63,000 778 million Euro 2003 EU Regulation 1726/2003
2003 MARPOL Amendment
2005 EU Third Maritime Safety Package
Abbreviations: CLC = International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage; FUND = International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage; MARPOL = International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships
(MARPOL is abbreviation for Marine Pollution); MoU = Memorandum of Understanding; SOLAS = International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS is abbreviation for Safety of Life at Sea); Sources: Adapted from Bijwaard and Knapp (2009) and Knapp and Franses (2009).
Oil Pollution Act in the United States in 1990 while the Erika
and Prestige oil spills (1999 and 2002) led to the revision of
regulations in the European Union (EU), the so-called EU
Third Maritime Safety Package (Bijwaard and Knapp 2009).
Table 5 summarizes the principal marine oil spills that directly
led to the development of mandatory regulations relevant to
oil tankers. 
Similarly, it has been shown that voluntary initiatives such as
TOVALOP and OPOL (mentioned earlier) were designed to
preempt national regulation (Frynas 2009:93-94). OCIMF
themselves admit that its foundation was “initially the oil
industry's response to increasing public awareness of marine
pollution, particularly by oil, after the ‘Torrey Canyon’
incident [oil spill in 1967]”, while SIRE was a response to the
Exxon Valdez oil spill (Oil Companies International Marine
Forum 2011). Other voluntary initiatives responsible for the
earlier mentioned reduction in oil spills in U.S. waters in the
period 1990-1995 were also a response to the Exxon Valdez
spill and were based on the expectation of greater future
mandatory regulation by federal and state authorities. As this
author has previously argued, “many ‘voluntary’
environmental initiatives in the oil and gas sector may not have
happened without government pressures on the oil companies”
(Frynas 2009:96).  
In other words, CSR may serve to stave off mandatory
regulation. Previous research suggests that oil companies can
strategically influence the political process to their
commercial advantage (Frynas 1998, Frynas et al. 2006).
While lobbying by firms can occasionally help achieve more
stringent environmental regulations (McWilliams et al. 2002),
conversely CSR can occasionally benefit firms by influencing
regulators to be more lenient on industry-related regulations,
for instance, TOVALOP and OPOL have helped with the
establishment of the principle of the maximum amount of
compensation for oil spills irrespective of damage (Frynas
2009:94). In addition to specific lobbying and negotiation
efforts, reporting on CSR in general can help firms to influence
public opinion and decision makers by portraying firms as
responsible citizens that care about people and the
environment as much as about profits, while the same firms
may lobby for socially undesirable legislation such as labor
market flexibilization (Utting 2007) or continue to be secretive
about some parts of their operations such as anticorruption
programs (Transparency International 2008:24). Henriques
(2007:150) commented that it is ironic that CSR or
sustainability reports “were originally conceived as
mechanisms for companies to demonstrate that they were
being influenced by their stakeholders, rather than vehicles
for the opposite”. 
As a final fundamental limitation of CSR and related to the
previous argument, multinational oil companies may
occasionally face a conflict of interest between commercial
interests and environmental concerns. Oil and gas deposits are
often located in developing countries near or inside
ecologically vulnerable areas (Austin and Sauer 2002).
Commercial development of oil reserves carries a high risk of
significant oil spill damage in these areas, while the lack of
commercial development of these areas would mean less profit
for oil companies. Not surprisingly, even corporate leaders in
“sustainability” may decide that commercial interests are more
important than oil spill prevention. Examples include the
decision of Petrobras to drill for oil in the Yasuni National
Park in Ecuador (Chen 2007) and the construction of the BP-
Statoil Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through the catchment area for
mineral springs in the Asian country of Georgia (Centre for
Civic Initiatives et al. 2005). All three companies (Petrobras,
BP and Statoil) are considered global sustainability leaders in
the oil and gas sector, yet all three companies failed to observe
best environmental practices in these projects and disregarded
concerns raised by environmentalists and the governments of
Ecuador and Georgia about the dangers of oil spills. Indeed,
a study by Pegg (2006) previously argued that, given the firms’
inherent commercial self-interests, there are fewer distinctions
Ecology and Society 17(4): 4
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss4/art4/
Table 6. Quantity of oil spilled onshore and offshore per unit of hydrocarbon production (tonnes per million tonnes), by region
(2010 data).
 
Africa Asia/
Australasia
Europe Former Soviet
Union
Middle East North America South America Total
Onshore 53.11 4.86 1.39 0.48 0.79 3.40 12.86 7.08
Offshore 1.63 0.48 0.57 0.72 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.69
Unspecified 37.76 0.31 0.74 no data no data 2.13 no data 19.61
Total 17.27 1.57 0.70 0.58 0.62 2.67 4.04 4.51
Source: International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2011.
in terms of CSR between Western sustainability leaders and
Asian oil companies than many observers assume. 
Government regulation also has limitations. For instance, one
study demonstrated a number of weaknesses of the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC
Funds) including that compensation claims may not
necessarily be paid quickly or in full (Wren 2000), which may
potentially reduce financial incentives for oil spill prevention.
Another study compared public disclosure of oil spill data
from offshore installations in four countries (United States,
Australia, Canada, and the UK), and found that there was
significant variation in the available spill data statistics and
that no country provided full disclosure of spill data; the lack
of reliable spill data disclosure may negatively affect post-
spill adaptation as the scale of environmental effects is more
difficult to assess, insufficient information is available to
assess the accuracy of predictions made in the environmental
assessment process, and it may not be possible to compare
regional differences in spill rates (Fraser et al. 2008).  
Possibly the main limitation of government legislation is that
many developing countries may not have the capacity to
effectively regulate a technically sophisticated industry such
as the oil and gas sector and formal regulatory approaches to
environmental issues have often failed in developing
countries. For instance, the legal framework for the control
and management of water pollution in Nigeria has been found
to be inadequate in a number of studies, pointing to the lack
of technical/institutional capacity among Nigerian government
agencies for enforcing high environmental standards (Frynas
2000, Adedeji and Ako 2009). Statistical data by the
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
demonstrates a wide gap in the frequency of oil spills between
developed and developing countries. In 2010, the volume of
oil spills per million tonnes hydrocarbon production (i.e., spill
volume adjusted for oil production volume) was 17.27 tonnes
in Africa, compared with 0.7 tonnes in Europe (see Table 6).
Onshore oil spills (which are largely subject to national and
local legislation only) present a much larger environmental
hazard than offshore oil spills (which benefit from
improvements as a result of international legislation such as
the MARPOL convention) (see Table 4) and this is most
evident in developing countries: 53.11 tonnes in African
onshore oil spills versus only 1.63 tonnes in African offshore
oil spills (see Table 6). In turn, these statistics are related to
the fact that the same companies apply very different
environmental standards in different legal jurisdictions. For
instance, while Royal Dutch Shell claims to have in place some
exemplary environmental practices in developed countries
(Rookmin and Herremans 2008, Sluyterman 2010), recent
reports by the UN Environment Programme and Amnesty
International found that Shell still does not apply some basic
international standards with regard to oil spills in Nigeria
where Shell has caused thousands of oil spills since the start
of oil operations in the late 1950s (Amnesty International
2011, United Nations Environment Program 2011).  
Nonetheless, the main strength of mandatory regulation is that
it can create a regulatory system that applies to every company
within a given jurisdiction, while voluntary CSR initiatives
normally only apply to companies that voluntarily choose to
be part of a specific initiative.  
One notable example of the advantages of government
regulation is the phasing out of single-hull oil tankers and the
introduction of double-hull tankers. For instance, all shipping
companies in U.S. waters have to abide by the 1990 Oil
Pollution Act; notably, all companies are obliged to convert
their fleets to double-hull tankers for most tanker trades by
2015, while amendments to the MARPOL convention also
mandate the phasing out of single-hull tankers on a global
scale. Statistical studies demonstrate that double-hull tankers
have a lower incidence rate than single-hull tankers and that
double-hull design significantly reduces the size of oil spills
on average (Bijwaard and Knapp 2009, Yip et al. 2011) and
that MARPOL amendments related to the phaseout of single-
hull tankers decreased the number of pollution incidents and,
to some extent, the amount of pollution (Knapp and Franses
2009). Alongside international conventions, national
legislation can make a critical contribution toward oil spill
prevention. Most notably, statistical studies demonstrate that
there was a reduction in the number and volume of oil spills
in U.S. waters as a result of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act,
specifically as a result of increased legal liability for oil spills
and the introduction of double hulls (Ketkar 2002, Homan and
Steiner 2008). Voluntary initiatives would unlikely succeed
in forcing every single ship owner to convert to double-hull
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tankers because there are wide differences in terms of
approaches to safety across the industry.
CONCLUSION
Evidence presented here demonstrates that oil spill prevention
has generally improved over recent decades, but it is less clear
to what extent CSR played a part in these improvements. The
existing literature does not as yet provide unambiguous
evidence of causality between CSR and oil spill reduction.
Causality between mandatory government regulation and oil
spill reduction is much more clearly established. 
CSR has potentially some benefits vis-à-vis mandatory
regulation. Environmental challenges benefit from the specific
expertise that companies possess, as these specific technical
and managerial skills can help bring about environmental
improvements. Voluntary initiatives can be implemented
faster than government policy, and they can greatly exceed
the requirements of legal compliance by leading to innovations
in the use of materials, technologies, or operating procedures.
Most crucially, voluntary environmental initiatives can lead
to win-win outcomes: the environmental impact of companies
is reduced, while companies benefit from lower operating
costs, better equipment, and innovation. In this context, one
can distinguish between outcome-setting CSR (e.g., voluntary
introduction of double-hull ships or setting of a zero-spill
policy as a desired outcome) and process-setting CSR
(development of better oil spill cleanup techniques or
establishment of the SIRE database as processes for achieving
desired outcomes). The evidence in this study points to the
general strengths of process-setting CSR and weaknesses of
outcome-setting CSR. 
However, given the various benefits of voluntary self-
regulation for companies themselves, it is perhaps surprising
that there are wide differences in terms of oil spill prevention
and self-reporting of oil spills across the industry. Some
companies may be more active on environmental
improvements than others because companies react differently
to the economic opportunities for voluntary action; for
instance, companies may be slow in recognizing the economic
opportunities associated with CSR, they may be risk-averse,
they may find it difficult to reengineer their internal
management systems or they may sacrifice future economic
opportunities at the expense of short-term financial
considerations. 
Conversely, mandatory regulation can help to reduce
uncertainties about the future, improve the economic
incentives for companies to act responsibly, and ensure a level
playing field for everyone. Furthermore, mandatory regulation
can create a regulatory system that applies to every single
company within a given jurisdiction, not just “volunteer”
companies. Indeed, our research suggests that various
voluntary CSR initiatives may not have come into existence
without pressures for mandatory government regulation. This
further points to the importance of the outcome-setting role of
government intervention. 
However, it is obvious that mandatory government regulation
is not a panacea. Appeals by nongovernment organizations for
more mandatory regulation seem to ignore the many historical
failures of formal regulatory approaches to social and
environmental issues, especially in developing countries. On
one hand, evidence suggests that both CSR initiatives (e.g.,
introduction of SIRE) and mandatory government regulation
(e.g., universal adoption of double-hull tankers) have
benefited oil spill prevention. On the other hand, evidence
suggests that both CSR and government regulation have failed
to instill global best practices in terms of oil spill prevention
in parts of the developing world, especially with regard to
onshore oil spills. 
It follows that we need to learn more about the optimal balance
of voluntary and mandatory, national and international,
prescriptive and enabling regulation. Debates on CSR must
therefore move beyond unproductive calls for or against CSR
or government regulation toward studying new hybrid forms
of regulation, supported by capacity building of public
agencies in developing countries. Such hybrid regulation can
include public voluntary programs (e.g., environmental
agency inviting firms to voluntarily apply certain
environmental standards such as previous programs to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions) and negotiated agreements
between firms and regulators (e.g., the government setting
abatement targets and the environmental agency negotiating
with firms on the best methods and timetable for achieving
abatement targets) (Carraro and Lévêque 1999, Khanna 2001).
 
Some hybrid regulations on environmental practices already
exist but the evidence on their effectiveness is mixed even
when the same public agency is involved; for instance, a
number of public voluntary programs initiated by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) have been
considered a significant success, while a number of negotiated
agreements involving USEPA had little success (Khanna
2001). The author believes that an optimal hybrid regulation
would combine outcome-setting by a government within its
jurisdiction (setting appropriate environmental outcomes and
compelling firms to join an initiative) with process-setting
CSR (using the creativity of the private sector to find solutions
for achieving desired environmental outcomes). One possible
explanation why some hybrid regulations in the oil and gas
sector had previously limited success is that the government
was not ambitious, focused or effective enough in terms of
outcome-setting and/or was too closely involved in terms of
process-setting; for instance, studies demonstrate that the
crucial limitation of the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative was the misplaced focus on government revenues
instead of the more important government expenditures
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(Frynas 2009, Kolstad and Wiig 2009). Future research needs
to investigate the factors that are necessary for effective hybrid
regulations. 
Papers in this special issue demonstrate that local communities
are highly dependent on external public and private bodies to
adapt to oil spills. It is high time that public and private bodies
work more closely together not just to adapt to environmental
disasters, but to prevent such disasters in the first instance.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5073
Acknowledgments:
The author is very grateful to the reviewers and the editor for
comments on earlier drafts, which have helped to improve the
quality of the paper.
LITERATURE CITED
Adedeji, A. A., and R. T. Ako. 2009. Towards achieving the
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals: the
imperative of reforming water pollution control and waste
management laws in Nigeria. Desalination 248:642–649. 
Amnesty International. 2011. The true ‘tragedy’: delays and
failures in tackling oil spills in the Niger Delta. Amnesty
International, London, United Kingdom. 
Austin, D., and A. Sauer. 2002. Changing oil: emerging
environmental risks and shareholder value in the oil and gas
industry. World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C., USA. 
Bijwaard, G. E., and S. Knapp. 2009. Analysis of ship life
cycles – the impact of economic cycles and ship inspections.
Marine Policy 33(2):350–369. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2008.08.003 
Blowfield, M. and J.G. Frynas. 2005. Setting new agendas -
critical perspectives on corporate social responsibility in the
developing world. International Affairs 81(3):499-513. 
Blowfield, M., and A. Murray. 2008. Corporate responsibility
- a critical introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
UK. 
Burgherr, P. 2007. In-depth analysis of accidental oil spills
from tankers in the context of global spill trends from all
sources. Journal of Hazardous Materials 140(1-2):245-256.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhazmat.2006.07.030 
Carraro, C., and F. Lévêque, editors. 1999. Voluntary
approaches in environmental policy. Kluwer, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands. 
Carroll, A. B. 1999. Corporate social responsibility - evolution
of a definitional construct. Business and Society 38:268–295.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000765039903800303 
Centre for Civic Initiatives, Committee for the Protection of
Oil Workers Rights, CEE Bankwatch Network, Green
Alternative, Kurdish Human Rights Project, PLATFORM,
and Urgewald. 2005. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline:
human rights, social and environmental impacts (Georgia
Section) - final report of fact finding mission, September,
16-18, 2005. Centre for Civic Initiatives, Committee for the
Protection of Oil Workers Rights, CEE Bankwatch Network,
Green Alternative, Kurdish Human Rights Project,
PLATFORM, and Urgewald, Baku, Azerbaijan. 
Chen, M. E. 2007. National oil companies and corporate
citizenship: a survey of transnational policy and practice. The
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University,
Houston, Texas, USA. 
Clark, R. B., editor. 1982. The long-term effects of oil pollution
on marine populations, communities and ecosystems. Royal
Society, London, UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1982.0037 
Estrada, J., K. Tangen, and H. O. Bergesen. 1997.
Environmental challenges confronting the oil industry. Wiley,
New York, USA. 
Fraser, G. S., J. Ellis, and L. Hussain. 2008. An international
comparison of governmental disclosure of hydrocarbon spills
from offshore oil and gas installations. Marine Pollution
Bulletin 56:9–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2007.09.032 
Freeman, I., and A. Hasnaoui. 2011. The meaning of corporate
social responsibility: the vision of four nations. Journal of
Business Ethics 100(3):419-443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10551-010-0688-6 
Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and freedom. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, USA. 
Frynas, J. G. 1998. Political instability and business: focus on
Shell in Nigeria. Third World Quarterly 19(3):457-479. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436599814343 
Frynas, J. G. 2000. Oil in Nigeria: conflict and litigation
between oil companies and village communities. LIT Verlag
and Transaction Publishers, Hamburg, Germany and New
Brunswick, New Jersey, USA. 
Frynas, J. G. 2009. Beyond corporate social responsibility –
oil multinationals and social challenges. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511581540 
Frynas, J. G. 2010. Oil industry’s increasing focus on CSR.
Petroleum Economist February. 
Frynas, J. G., K. Mellahi, and G. Pigman. 2006. First mover
advantages in international business and firm-specific
Ecology and Society 17(4): 4
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss4/art4/
political resources. Strategic Management Journal 27:321-345.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.519 
Gillies, A. 2010. Reputational concerns and the emergence of
oil sector transparency as an international norm. International
Studies Quarterly 54(1):103-126. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-2478.2009.00579.x 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 2006. G3 Guidelines.
[online] URL: http://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/
latest-guidelines/g3-guidelines/Pages/default.aspx 
Henderson, D. 2001. Misguided virtue: false notions of
corporate social responsibility. Institute of Economic Affairs,
London, UK. 
Henriques, A. 2007. Corporate truth - the limits to
transparency. Earthscan, London, United Kingdom. 
Homan, A. C., and T. Steiner. 2008. OPA 90’s impact at
reducing oil spills. Marine Policy 32:711–718. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.marpol.2007.12.004 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2003.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2004.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2005.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2006.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2007.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2008.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2009.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2010.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. 2011.
Environmental performance in the E&P industry.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, London,
United Kingdom. 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, editor. 2004.
The lOPC Funds’ 25 years of compensating victims of oil
pollution incidents. International Oil Pollution Compensation
Funds, London, UK. 
IPIECA. 2010. Oil and gas industry guidance on voluntary
sustainability reporting. [online] URL: http://www.ipieca.
org/sites/default/files/publications/Reporting_Guidance-28_Sept_2011.
pdf 
Kanter, R. M. 1999. From spare change to real change: the
social sector as beta site for business innovation. Harvard
Business Review 77(3):122-132. 
Ketkar, K. W. 2002. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: a decade
later. Spill Science & Technology Bulletin 7(1-2):45–52. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1353-2561(02)00052-X 
Khanna, M. 2001. Non-mandatory approaches to
environmental protection. Journal of Economic Surveys 15
(3):291-324. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00141 
Khanna, M., and W. R. Q. Anton. 2002. Corporate
environmental management: regulatory and market-based
pressures. Land Economics 78(4):539–558. 
Kim, I. 2002. Ten years after the enactment of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990: a success or a failure. Marine Policy 26:197–207.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(02)00002-7 
King, A., and M. Lenox. 2002. Exploring the locus of
profitable pollution reduction. Management Science 48:289–
299. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.2.289.258 
Knapp, S., G. E. Bijwaard, and C. Heij. 2011. Estimated
incident cost savings in shipping due to inspections. Accident
Analysis and Prevention 43:1532–1539. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.aap.2011.03.005 
Knapp, S., and P. H. Franses. 2009. Does ratification matter
and do major conventions improve safety and decrease
pollution in shipping? Marine Policy 33:826–846. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2009.03.005 
Knapp, S., and M. van de Velden. 2011. Global ship risk
profiles: safety and the marine environment. Transportation
Research Part D 16(8):595–603. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
trd.2011.08.001 
Kolstad, I., and A. Wiig. 2009. Is transparency the key to
reducing corruption in resource-rich countries? World
Development 37(3):521-532. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2008.07.002 
Ecology and Society 17(4): 4
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss4/art4/
KPMG International. 2011. KPMG International survey of
corporate responsibility reporting 2011. [online] URL: http://
www.kpmg.com/PT/pt/IssuesAndInsights/Documents/corporate-
responsibility2011.pdf 
Lanjouw, J. O., and A. Mody. 1996. Innovation and the
international diffusion of environmentally responsive
technology. Research Policy 25:549-571. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/0048-7333(95)00853-5 
Lockett, A., J. Moon, and W. Wisser. 2006. Corporate social
responsibility in management research: focus, nature, salience
and sources of influence. Journal of Management Studies 43
(1):115-136. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00585.
x 
Matten, D., and A. Crane. 2005. Corporate citizenship: toward
an extended theoretical conceptualization. Academy of
Management Review 30(1):166–179. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/
AMR.2005.15281448 
Matten, D., and J. Moon. 2008. "Implicit" and "explicit" CSR:
a conceptual framework for a comparative understanding of
corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management
Review 33(2):404–424. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/
AMR.2008.31193458 
McWilliams, A., D. D. Van Fleet, and K.D. Cory. 2002.
Raising rivals' costs through political strategy: an extension
of resource-based theory. Journal of Management Studies 39
(5):707-723. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00308 
Miles, M., and J. Covin. 2000. Environmental marketing: a
source of reputational, competitive, and financial advantage.
Journal of Business Ethics 23:299–311. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1023/A:1006214509281 
Molina-Azorín, J. F., J. J. Tarí, E. Claver-Cortés and M. D.
López-Gamero. 2009. Quality management, environmental
management and firm performance: a review of empirical
studies and issues of integration. International Journal of
Management Reviews 11(2):197–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-2370.2008.00238.x 
Nakamura, M., T. Takahashi, and I. Vertinsky. 2001. Why
Japanese firms choose to certify: a study of managerial
responses to environmental issues. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 42(1):23–52. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1148 
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF). 2011.
Website of Oil Companies International Marine Forum.
[online] URL: fhttp://www.ocimf.com/ (accessed 17 October
2011). 
Ottaway, M. 2001. Reluctant missionaries. Foreign Policy 
July/August:44-54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3183326 
Pegg, S. 2006. World leaders and bottom feeders: divergent
strategies toward social responsibility and resource extraction.
Pages 249-269 in Christopher May, editor. Global corporate
power. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, USA. 
Porter, M. E., and M. R. Kramer. 2006. Strategy & society –
the link between competitive advantage and corporate social
responsibility. Harvard Business Review 84(12):78-92. 
Porter, M. E., and C. Van Der Linde. 1995. Green and
competitive: ending the stalemate. Harvard Business Review 
73(5):120-134. 
Rookmin, M., and I. M. Herremans. 2008. Shell Canada: over
a decade of sustainable development reporting experience.
Corporate governance: the International Journal of Effective
Board Performance 8(3):235-247. 
Runhaar, H. and H. Lafferty. 2009. Governing corporate social
responsibility: an assessment of the contribution of the UN
Global Compact to CSR strategies in the telecommunications
industry. Journal of Business Ethics 84(4):479-495. 
Sharma, S., and H. Vredenburg. 1998. Proactive corporate
environmental strategy and the development of competitively
valuable organizational capabilities. Strategic Management
Journal 19(8):729-753. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)
1097-0266(199808)19:8<729::AID-SMJ967>3.0.CO;2-4 
Sluyterman, K. 2010. Royal Dutch Shell: company strategies
for dealing with environmental issues. Business History
Review 84(2):203-226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007680500002580 
Soares de Oliveira, R. 2007. Oil and politics in the Gulf of
Guinea. Columbia University Press, New York, USA. 
Sørstrøm, S. E., P. J. Brandvik, I. Buist, P. Daling, D. Dickins,
L.-G. Faksness, S. Potter, J. F. Rasmussen, and I. Singsaas.
2010. Joint industry program on oil spill contingency for
Arctic and ice-covered waters. SINTEF joint industry
program. Oil in Ice Report No.32. [online] URL: http://www.
sintef.no/project/JIP_Oil_In_Ice/Dokumenter/publications/JIP-
rep-no-32-Summary-report.pdf 
SustainAbility. 2001. Buried treasure: uncovering the
business case for corporate sustainability. SustainAbility and
United Nations Environment Programme, London, UK. 
SustainAbility. 2002. Developing value: the business case for
sustainability in emerging markets. SustainAbility,
International Finance Corporation and Ethos, London, UK. 
Transparency International. 2008. Promoting revenue
transparency - 2008 report on revenue transparency of oil and
gas companies. Transparency International, Berlin, Germany. 
Uchida, T., and P. J. Ferraro. 2007. Voluntary development
of environmental management systems: motivations and
Ecology and Society 17(4): 4
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss4/art4/
regulatory implications. Journal of Regulatory Economics 
32:37-65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-9016-6 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2011.
Environmental assessment of Ogoniland. UNEP, Nairobi,
Kenya. 
U.S. logs 7 years without massive oil spill. Oil & Gas Journal 
1996. August 19:36. 
Utting, P. 2007. CSR and equality. Third World Quarterly 28
(4):697-712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590701336572 
Van Der Linde, C. 1993. The microeconomic implication of
environmental regulation : a preliminary framework. In
Environmental policies and industrial competitiveness.
OECD, Paris, France. 
Waldman, D. A., M. S. de Luque, N. Washburn, R. J. House,
B. Adetoun, A. Barrasa, M. Bobina, M. Bodur, Y. Chen, S.
Debbarma, P. Dorfman, R. R. Dzuvichu, I. Evcimen, P. Fu,
M. Grachev, R. Gonzalez Duarte, V. Gupta, D. N Den Hartog,
A. H. B. de Hoogh, J. Howell, K. Jone, H. Kabasakal, E.
Konrad, P. L. Koopman, R. Lang, C. Lin, J. Liu, B. Martinez,
A. E. Munley, N. Papalexandris, T. K. Peng, L. Prieto, N.
Quigley, J. Rajasekar, F. G. Rodríguez, J. Steyrer, B. Tanure,
H. Thierry, V. M. Thomas, P. T van den Berg, and C. P. M.
Wilderom. 2006. Cultural and leadership predictors of
corporate social responsibility values of top management: a
GLOBE study of 15 countries. Journal of International
Business Studies 37(6):823-837. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/
palgrave.jibs.8400230 
Wren, J. 2000. Overview of the compensation and liability
regimes under the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund (IOPC). Spill Science & Technology 6(1):45-58. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1353-2561(00)00067-0 
Yip, T. L., W. K. Talley, and D. Jin. 2011. The effectiveness
of double hulls in reducing vessel-accident oil spillage. Marine
Pollution Bulletin 62(11):2427-2432. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.marpolbul.2011.08.026
